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WHEN STATES MEDIATE
Molly M. Melin*
INTRODUCTION
The use of mediation for conflict resolution is not a new
process. The first recorded mediation efforts occurred in 209 B.C.,
when Greek city-states helped the Aetolian League and Macedonia
produce a truce in the first Macedonian war. Since then, mediation
has been increasingly employed as a tool for peacefully resolving
conflict.1 The International Conflict Management Dataset2 reports
1334 mediation attempts by states in 333 interstate and civil conflicts
since World War II, with more than half of the mediation efforts
occurring since the end of the Cold War.3 States represent the most
* Molly M. Melin, Assistant Professor of International Relations, Loyola
University Chicago.
1 The benefits of successful mediation are widespread. Consider the case
of the Northern Irish “Troubles.” Beginning with the Good Friday Accords and
continuing with the work of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in mediating
interpersonal disputes, the relative peace in Northern Ireland today is a testament
to the power of a well-orchestrated and sustained mediation effort.
2 JACOB BERCOVITCH, THE INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
DATASET: OFFICIAL CODEBOOK FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
MANAGEMENT DATASET (1999); J. MICHAEL GREIG & PAUL F. DIEHL,
INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION 31 (2012). The International Conflict Management
dataset was compiled by Professor Jacob Bercovitch in the late 1990s and focuses
on the mechanisms used in international conflict management. JACOB
BERCOVITCH, VICTOR KREMENYUK & I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, THE SAGE
HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 570 (2008) (defining international conflict
as “organised and continuous militarized conflict, or a demonstration of intention
to use military force involving at least one state.”).
3
BERCOVITCH, supra note 2, at 31.
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common type of political actor willing to serve as a mediator in
international dispute resolution—a category often referred to as
“state-led” mediation. Not all states, however, volunteer to serve as
mediators and not all disputes receive mediator assistance. This essay
examines the drivers of such choices and suggests factors that
policymakers should consider when assessing whether to engage in
state-led mediation.
An understanding of these factors will help policymakers
generate expectations about which states are likely to have an interest
in mediating conflicts (and can be successfully encouraged to do so),
and which disputants are likely to accept state-led mediation offers
(thereby avoiding the loss of face associated with rejection). The
objective of this exercise is to assist the policymaker in identifying the
circumstances where state-led mediation will have a positive and
permanent influence on long-term peace. Section I of the paper
describes the role states play in the mediation process, both in terms
of the broader spectrum of mediators and in terms of involvement
frequency. Section II discusses the conditions that facilitate state-led
mediation efforts, and the conclusion offers recommendations for
achieving more effective state-led mediation efforts.
I. THE STATE AS PEACEMAKER—A STRATEGIC CHOICE?
There are four main types of mediators: international
organizations (e.g., the United Nations), regional governmental
organizations (e.g., the Arab League), individuals (e.g., former United
States President Jimmy Carter), and states (e.g., New Zealand). States
are the most common mediator and the focus of this paper.4
Mediation works differently across mediator types. Of particular

For work on mediation involving regional organizations, see generally
Scott Sigmund Gartner, Signs of Trouble: Regional Organization Mediation and Civil War
Agreement Durability, 73 J. POL. 380 (2011). For work on international organizations,
see generally Holley E. Hansen, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell & Stephen C. Nemeth,
IO Mediation of Interstate Conflicts: Moving Beyond the Global versus Regional Dichotomy, 52
J.CONFLICT RESOL. 295 (2008); Megan Shannon, Preventing War and Providing the
Peace? International Organizations and the Management of Territorial Disputes, 26 CONFLICT
MGMT. & PEACE SCI.144 (2009).
4
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note, the motivations of states for offering mediation assistance differ
from those of the other actors.5
States carefully consider when and where they mediate, and
often consider the strategic benefits when deciding whether to take
on the mediator role. Potential gains include establishing a reputation
as a peacemaker (as have Norway and Sweden) and enhancing the
state’s influence in the dispute’s outcome, either by changing an
unfavorable situation or maintaining a favorable status quo.
Understandably, states are more likely to take up the role of mediator
if it will expand their influence, resources, and power. Figure 1
depicts the number of conflicts and state-led mediation efforts over
time.6 While the number of mediation efforts per year closely follows
the number of disputes per year, the two lines never intersect—a
characteristic I explore further below.

5 For example, international organizations often include peacemaking as
a part of their charter (e.g., the African Union and Organization of American
States), but frequently must overcome political struggles between members before
mediation can occur. Conversely, state mediators often struggle to establish
impartibility given their significant stake in the outcome of the mediation efforts.
States also have more policy instruments at their disposal than international
organizations, allowing for greater variation in reactions to external conflict—most
notably, joining the conflict in support of one side, an unlikely occurrence when an
international organization leads mediation.
6 BERCOVITCH, supra note 2, at 31.
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Figure 1. The Occurrence of Disputes and State-Led Mediation
Efforts, 1945-1999
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The figure also contains information about state-led
mediation decisions. There are at least two possible ways to explain
mediation occurrence. First, it is possible to think of states as a
population of mediators that indiscriminately mediate any disputes
that arise. Although this description may seem extreme, it is not far
from popular beliefs about the obligations of the Great Powers. The
global community often views states with large capabilities as being
obligated to respond to instances of extreme violence. The second
explanation sees mediation as resulting from strategic calculations. In
this case, states do not indiscriminately mediate, but rather consider
the costs and benefits before agreeing to do so.
If the former proposition is correct, the supply of mediators
would remain relatively constant. And if the supply of mediators was
constant, we would observe stability in the number of mediation
efforts. Years with many conflicts would likely experience mediator
supply problems with a large gap between the number of disputes
and the number of mediation efforts. In years with fewer disputes,
most disputes would be mediated. The data, however, does not seem
to support the proposition that Great Powers feel any significant
81
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obligations to mediate by virtue of their leadership role in the global
community.
Indeed, a further unpacking of the data seems to endorse the
latter view—that a state’s decision to serve as a mediator is the result
of strategic calculations. Figure 2 graphs the gap between the two
lines from Figure 1, showing the variation in the number of disputes
that go without state-led mediation. There is no year for which all
disputes are mediated by states (no matter how few disputes are
observed), and there is variation in the percent mediated—both
provide evidence that states make strategic mediation choices.
Figure 2. The Gap Between the Number of Conflicts and
Mediation Occurrence, 1945-1999
The Gap Between Mediation and Disputes
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II. IDENTIFYING THE OPTIMAL CONDITIONS FOR STATE-LED
MEDIATION
Unlike sanctions or military intervention, a prerequisite to the
occurrence of mediation is the acceptability of mediation to all
involved parties. An often cited definition of mediation highlights
this characteristic, describing mediation as “a reactive process of
conflict management whereby parties seek the assistance of, or accept
an offer of help from, an individual, group, or organization to change
their behavior, settle their conflict, or resolve their problem without
82
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resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law.”7
Generally, political or economic ties between a potential mediator
and the disputants increase the occurrence of mediation.8 These ties
generate state interest in conflict resolution, and often translate into
leverage at the negotiating table.9 The remainder of this essay
explores the conditions that increase mediation occurrence (both in
terms of state willingness to mediate and in terms of belligerents
accepting state-led mediation) and success, as summarized in Table 1.

7 Jacob Bercovitch & Allison Houston, The Study of International Mediation:
Theoretical Issues and Empirical Evidence, in RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS:
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MEDIATION 11, 13 (Jacob Bercovitch ed., 1996).
8 Ties that affect mediation offers and acceptance include trading
partnerships, alliances, physical proximity, and even former colonial ties. For an indepth analysis of how ties affect mediation and conflict management behavior, see
generally Molly M. Melin, The Impact of State Relationship on If, When, and How Conflict
Management Occurs, 55 INT’L STUD. Q. 691 (2011).
9 For more on mediator leverage see Kyle Beardsley, Using the Right Tool
for the Job: Mediator Leverage and Conflict Resolution, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 57
(2013).
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Table 1. Summary of Factors that Affect Mediation
Explanatory
Variable

Effect on Mediation
Occurrence

Effect on Mediation
Outcome

Regime Type

Democracy increases
mediation occurrence

Democracy increases
mediation success

Third-Party
Capabilities

Capable mediators
increase mediation
occurrence

Capable mediators
increase mediation
success

Conflict Costs

Violence increases
mediation occurrence

Violence increases
mediation success

Rivalries &
Reoccurring Conflict

Rivalries & reoccurrence
increases mediation
occurrence

not observed

Mediation History

Previous mediation
increases mediation
occurrence

not observed

Conflict Stalemate

Stalemate increases
mediation occurrence

not observed

Conflict Nature

International conflicts
increase mediation
occurrence

not observed

A. Regime Type
Regime type plays an important role in the frequency and
likely success of mediation. Regime type, or form of government, can
encourage mediation and its success at several levels. Mediation and
accepting offers of mediation are more likely when democracies are
involved, as these states are accustomed to third-party involvement in
conflict and garner other states’ trust, making them a more attractive
option for conflict resolution.10 Democratic third parties are more
Mark J.C. Crescenzi, Kelly M. Kadera, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell &
Clayton L. Thyne, A Supply Side Theory of Mediation, 55 INT’L STUD. Q. 1069, 108485 (2011).
10
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likely to be accepted as mediators, democratic disputants are more
likely to accept mediation, and a democratic international community
increases mediation use. Democratic disputants are more accepting of
mediation because their populace is accustomed to third-party
involvement in domestic conflicts, thus lowering the political costs of
mediation acceptance.11 A strong democratic community globally
encourages even non-democracies to adopt the behavior of
democracies, such as employing third-party resolution, which
increases the use of mediation.12 A shared democratic culture
between disputants and the mediator is more likely to generate an
agreement, as democracies employ negotiation and compromise in
disputes with other democracies but distrust the intentions of nondemocratic states and are less willing to rely on techniques of
peaceful conflict resolution in those conflicts.13 Mediation is therefore
best encouraged when democracies are involved as disputants and
mediators. An apt illustration of this principle in action was Turkey’s
willingness to work with British and American mediators following
the 2010 Gaza-bound flotilla incident. As democratic norms continue
to spread, state-led mediation will be increasingly employed to resolve
disputes.
B. Third-Party Capabilities
States (or third parties) with material strength and diplomatic
prowess are likely to be accepted and successful as mediators because
these actors have access to resources and negotiating experience that
makes them attractive as mediators and able to create and sustain
peace. Before a state can act, however, it must have the capabilities
necessary to be effective as a mediator.14 Mediation is therefore more
likely when capable third parties have interests in involvement, as
these actors have the ability to be involved. While capable third
parties are certainly not always successful (consider Kofi Annan’s
James A. Wall Jr., John B. Stark & Rhetta L. Standifer, Mediation: A
Current Review and Theory Development, 45 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 370, 372-3 (2001).
12 See generally Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, A Kantian System? Democracy and
Third-Party Conflict Resolution, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 749 (2002).
13 Russell J. Leng & Patrick M. Regan, Social and Political Cultural Effects on
the Outcomes of Mediation in Militarized Interstate Disputes, 47 INT’L STUD. Q. 431, 435
(2003).
14 Melin, supra note 8, at 706.
11
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efforts in Syria), their capabilities and reputation mean they are likely
to be deemed “acceptable” to the disputants.15 Mediators with
material capabilities can incentivize agreements by using the
proverbial carrot and stick to increase an agreement’s appeal or
threaten failed compliance.16 For example, the Great Powers are
often actively involved in conflict management, as was the case with
European and Chinese involvement in Darfur. In selecting third
parties with the assets necessary to create and enforce peace,
policymakers can encourage mediation and its success.
C. Conflict Costs
The more costly a conflict is in terms of violence, the more
likely it is to be “ripe” for state-led mediation.17 The increased
international pressure and the disputants’ cost-benefit calculus create
an appealing climate for state-led mediation efforts. Costly conflicts
generally attract international interest. The international spotlight
offers a state mediator the opportunity to gain in terms of reputation
and influence. For example, New Zealand benefited from an
enhanced regional role after successfully mediating the Bougainville
conflict,18 as did Switzerland in bringing peace between the Algerian
independence movement and the French government.19 Disputants
also are more likely to accept mediation offers as the cost of conflict
increases because increasing costs impact the disputants’ assessment
15 For work on the challenges of mediation in Syria, see J. Michael Greig,
Intractable Syria? Insights from the Scholarly Literature on the Failure of Mediation, 2 PENN
ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 48 (2013).
16 Kyle C. Beardsley et al., Mediation Style and Crisis Outcomes, 50 J.
CONFLICT RES. 58, 83 (2006).
17 See generally I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, RIPE FOR RESOLUTION: CONFLICT
AND INTERVENTION IN AFRICA (1985).
18 See Scott Sigmund Gartner, Civil War Peacemaking, in PEACE AND
CONFLICT 2012: A GLOBAL SURVEY OF ARMED CONFLICTS, SELFDETERMINATION MOVEMENTS, AND DEMOCRACY 71, 78 (J. Joseph Hewitt et al.
eds., 2012). See generally REBECCA ADAMS, PEACE ON BOUGAINVILLE: TRUCE
MONITORING GROUP (2001); BOUGAINVILLE BEFORE THE CONFLICT (Anthony J.
Regan & Helga M. Griffin eds., 2005); MONICA WEHNER & DONALD DENOON,
WITHOUT A GUN: AUSTRALIANS’ EXPERIENCES MONITORING PEACE IN
BOUGAINVILLE, 1997-2001, 43-48 (2001).
19 See generally JOHN RUEDY, MODERN ALGERIA: THE ORIGINS AND
DEVELOPMENT OF A NATION (2005).
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of whether continued death, destruction and expenditures are worth
achieving their initial objective. Furthermore, state mediators can
expect fewer actions will be required to resolve costly conflicts, given
the high cost of continued conflict.20
Increased costs also increase mediation success rates, as state
party mediators can provide domestic political cover and enable
leaders to agree to otherwise unacceptable terms.21 This was the case
in Sinai (1974), El Salvador (1988), and Mozambique (1992). In
highlighting the low costs and potential benefits of state-led
mediation, policymakers can encourage state actors to offer and
accept mediation.
D. Rivalries and Reoccurring Conflict
States may be more likely to accept mediation offers when
the disputants are strategic rivals or view each other as threatening
competitors.22 Such conflicts tend to be recurring, and especially
destabilizing and violent—not only to the disputants but to thirdparty state actors either located in the region or with other strong
relationships to the disputants. These rivalries also tend to gain
greater international attention. On first blush, these characteristics
may make an offer to mediate unappealing to a state actor.
Policymakers, however, should take care to note the considerable
potential benefits of accepting the offer: the state party’s interest in
building its reputation and in avoiding the costs associated with a
regionally destabilizing, violent and drawn-out conflict. Said another
way, although there is some risk in taking on the mediator role in
such circumstances, the risks of declining such an invitation may be
even greater. The illustrations for this factor show both sides of the
20 Lesley G. Terris & Zeev Maoz, Rational Mediation: A Theory and a Test,
42 J. PEACE RES. 563, 579-80 (2005) (arguing “the greater the versatility of the
conflict, (1) the more likely are disputants to seek mediation, (2) the more likely are
outside parties to mediate, and (3) the more intrusive the mediation strategies
employed.”).
21 Kyle Beardsley, Pain, Pressure and Political Cover: Explaining Mediation
Incidence, 47 J. PEACE RES. 395, 404 (2010).
22 Jacob Bercovitch & Paul F. Diehl, Conflict Management of Enduring
Rivalries: The Frequency, Timing, and Short-Term Impact of Mediation, 22 INT’L
INTERACTIONS 299, 316 (1997).
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calculation. While President Jimmy Carter’s efforts between Egypt
and Israel produced the still-intact Camp David Accords, mediation
efforts between India and Pakistan and on the Korean Peninsula
have been less successful.
E. Mediation History
States are more likely to agree to serve as mediators, and the
mediation is more likely to be successful, when the disputants and the
state have previously engaged in mediation. These prior mediation
experiences, or mediation history, establish rapport and signal a
commitment to peaceful conflict management. Mediation efforts are
not isolated events. Each instance creates a mediation history of the
state’s experience as a mediator and the disputants’ experiences in
working with mediators. In this broader process, previous mediation
encourages future efforts and success.23 Previous disputant
experiences with mediation signals a disputant’s willingness to work
with an outsider and encourages mediation offers by states. For
example, mediation was employed repeatedly in Yugoslavia, because
the parties had signaled they were willing to meet and negotiate, and
the mediator established trust and rapport with the belligerents. A
state’s mediation experience can signal to disputants the mediator’s
ability, preferred methods, resourcefulness, and objectives.24 To be
effective, the state mediator must be perceived as having access to
suitable techniques for encouraging bargaining, and as having
sufficient authority and experience to be able to utilize them.
Consider Sweden and Norway’s reputation as purveyors of peace
based on their history of mediation successes. Policymakers can
encourage mediation by involving experienced third-party state
mediators, especially when the disputants have exhibited openness to
mediation.

J. Michael Greig, Stepping into the Fray: When Do Mediators Mediate?, 49
AM. J. POL. SCI. 249, 255 (2005).
24 Oliver Richmond, Devious Objectives and the Disputants’ View of
International Mediation: A Theoretical Framework, 35 J. PEACE RES. 707, 713 (1998).
23
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F. Conflict Stalemate
Disputants sensing a conflict stalemate or seeing the
improbability of winning are likely to accept state-led mediation as it
offers a viable alternative to continued conflict. “When parties find
themselves locked in a conflict from which they cannot escalate to
victory and this deadlock is painful to both of them (although not
necessarily in equal degrees or for the same reasons), they seek a way
out.”25 Disputants that have reached a hurting stalemate are “ripe”
for mediation, since they cannot envision a successful outcome or an
end to unbearable costs if they continue current strategies. Mediation
offers a “way out” of an increasingly costly conflict. Henry Kissinger
(under U.S. President Nixon) highlighted the notion of a stalemate in
the Sinai withdrawal negotiations,26 as did Chester Crocker (under
U.S. President Reagan) in Angola.27 Similarly, policymakers can
encourage disputants to accept mediation by highlighting the
presence of a stalemate and the futility of further escalation.
G. Nature of the Conflict
The international or domestic nature of the conflict has
important implications for the effectiveness of the mediation effort
as the cost of involving mediators varies between civil and
international wars. Mediation is less likely in civil wars as it transfers
legitimacy to the non-state actor and can hinder state sovereignty. In
effect this means the political costs associated with accepting
international mediation will be substantially higher in civil wars.28
States therefore only accept mediation in the most serious civil
25 I. William Zartman, Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond, in
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION AFTER THE COLD WAR 225, 228 (Daniel
Druckman & Paul C. Stern eds., 2000).
26 See Briefing by Secretary of State Dr. Henry Kissinger on Sinai Agreement:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Armed Services, 94th Cong. 5 (1975).
27 See Angola: Options for American Foreign Policy: Hearing Before the Committee
on Foreign Relations, 99th Cong. 3-6 (1986).
28 Molly M. Melin & Isak Svensson, Incentives for Talking: Accepting
Mediation in International and Civil Wars, 35 INT’L INTERACTIONS 249, 254 (2009).
For work on civil wars and the role of veto players, see David E. Cunningham, Who
Should Be at the Table?: Veto Players and Peace Processes in Civil War, 2 PENN ST. J.L. &
INT’L AFF. 38 (2013).
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disputes, or when the benefits of peace outweigh the costs of
legitimizing an opponent. For example, Swedish opposition leader
Olof Palme was immediately recognized as a mediator in the war
between Iran and Iraq, but the Sri Lankan government took 17 years
to allow outside involvement with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE). Given this fear of legitimizing opponents, third-party
mediation offers are more likely to be accepted in international
conflicts. States seeking to mediate civil conflicts will need to
highlight other incentives, such as potential costs, before mediation is
accepted.
CONCLUSION
State mediators can have a significant impact on the creation
of a stable and sustainable peace. However, states should be selective
in deciding when and where to mediate—as such, the policymakers
tasked with this portfolio should be cognizant of the optimal
circumstances for state-led mediation. Threshold considerations
include the characteristics of the state, the nature and characteristics
of the conflict, and the characteristics of the disputants. The ideal
state mediator will have prior mediation experience, democratic
governance structures and access to the resources necessary to
enforce agreements. Democratic third parties and disputants are
more likely to agree to mediation and to generate an agreement.
Experienced mediators are more likely to be accepted, as are those
with greater capabilities and resources. Mediators that lack resources
and diplomatic experience and those from non-democracies are less
likely to be accepted or generate lasting peace. While policymakers
have less ability to influence the conflict characteristics, they can
encourage mediation by highlighting the presence of a stalemate, the
potential for escalation, and the costly nature of the conflict. By
carefully considering the appropriateness of mediation and
highlighting its benefits, states and disputants are more likely to
employ mediation as a conflict management tool for crafting a lasting
peace.
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